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Abstract
This Article examines the arguments that led the Supreme Court to its landmark judgment, in
particular: (i) the jurisdiction of federal courts to ascertain procedural challenges to the lawfulness
of military commission proceedings; (ii) the relation to the Geneva Convention; (iii) the aspect of
conspiracy as a (non-)legal basis for indictments issued before military commissions, especially in
the argument raised by the defense in the Hamdan case; and (iv) the case law of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) with respect to the concept of conspiracy
and joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”). The case law of the ICTY, as this Article argues, is also
relevant to the interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. This Article also
addresses the legal, political, and international (criminal) law implications of the Hamdan decision
and examines the proposed New Code of Military Commissions (“CMC”) for its compliance with
international law.
THE PROLIFERATION OF THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
WITHIN TERRORISM AND "UNLAWFUL"
COMBATANCY TRIALS AFTER
HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD
Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops *
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION
PROCEEDINGS IN HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD
On June 29, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered an his-
torical decision in the terrorism trials against detainees in Guan-
tanamo Bay before the military commissions initiated by the
President George W. Bush on November 13, 2001. These com-
missions were established to try individuals who are not U.S. re-
sidents and who the U.S. President has reason to assume are
members of Al Qaeda or have taken part in terrorist acts against
the United States.2 In the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, the Su-
preme Court distinguished among three categories of military
commissions that historically have been used in three different
situations. Military commissions of the first category were substi-
tutes for civilian courts in situations where "martial law has been
declared."' Military commissions of the second category-occu-
pied territory or military government commissions-were estab-
lished to try civilians "as part of a temporary military government
over occupied enemy territory or territory regained from an en-
emy where civilian government cannot and does not function. " '
The Hamdan case dealt with the third category of commission:
* Professor of international criminal law, Utrecht University; attorney at Knoops &
Partners Advocaten in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The author is acting defense
counsel before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY"), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"). As of October 2005, the author has been assigned as
an expert consultant on international criminal law with the Hamdan defense team. Spe-
cial thanks to Ms. Melinda Taylor, formerly a legal assistant in the ICTY defense office
and currently with the defense office of the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), who
worked with the author to draft the legal opinions for the Hamdan defense that are
relied upon in this Article.
1. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 2775.
4. Id. at 2776.
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one that considers acts "incident to the conduct of war," and
assesses whether disciplinary measures should be taken against
enemies who have violated military law in relation to the United
States.
The Hamdan decision qualifies as a landmark ruling: for
the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to ascer-
tain the legality of the terrorism trials before these military
commissions, trials distinct from those before U.S. federal courts
and U.S. court-martial proceedings. The Hamdan judgment ad-
dresses various subjects, such as compliance of military commis-
sion proceedings (of the third category) with the constitution-
ally-derived Rules of Procedure and Evidence that pertain to
court-martial cases, as well as with international law standards-
in particular the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 ("Geneva
Convention") regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.6
The Hamdan decision was issued after one of the Guanta-
namo Bay prisoners, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, raised these legal
challenges before the Supreme Court. Of Yemeni origin,
Hamdan was arrested by militia in November 2001, after the
U.S.-backed insurgency in Afghanistan overthrew the Al-Qaeda-
associated Taliban regime, and was subsequently handed over to
the U.S. military.7 In June 2002, he was transferred to Guanta-
namo Bay.' Since January 2002, a total of 759 individuals from
forty-nine countries have been detained, most of whom are from
Afghanistan, Saudi-Arabia, Yemen, and Pakistan.9 In 2006 this
detention facility held 450 individuals.10
More than a year after Hamdan's arrest, President Bush de-
termined that Hamdan should stand trial before a military com-
mission.1 Another year after that, he was formally charged with
5. Id.
6. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
7. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
8. See id.
9. See Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff Freedom of Information Act
Request Service Center, List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from Jan. 2002 through May 15, 2006, http://www.dod.mil/
pubs/foi/detainees/detaineesFOAreleasel5May2006.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
10. See International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), U.S. Detention Re-
lated to the Events of 11 September 2001 and its Aftermath-The Role of the ICRC,
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/usa-detention-update-121205?Open
Document (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
11. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
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conspiracy to commit the offenses of "attacking civilians; attack-
ing civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and
terrorism. " 12 In particular, the charge alleged that Hamdan had
served as Osama Bin Laden's body guard and personal driver
during the period from 1996 until November 2001.13
The Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") held that
Hamdan was to be considered as an enemy combatant, and con-
sequently his detention was deemed lawful.1 4 Hamdan subse-
quently challenged the lawfulness of these military commission
proceedings. On November 8, 2004, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia ruled in Hamdan's favor.15 It deter-
mined that the military commission that was to try Hamdan was
set up contrary to regulations of the U.S. court-martial system as
well as those of the Geneva Convention.16 As these military com-
mission proceedings do not exclude the possibility of convictions
being founded on evidence that the accused is not able to have
access to or even dispute, the Court concluded that such pro-
ceedings are unlawful. 7
On July 14, 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed this decision on appeal, holding that
Hamdan could not resort to the Geneva Convention in his de-
fense. 18 According to the Court of Appeals, the Geneva Conven-
tion cannot be relied on in a criminal case. 9 The Court opined
that the norms enshrined by the Geneva Convention do not con-
stitute individual rights, enforceable by individual defendants,
i.e., unlawful combatants. 20
This Article examines the arguments that led the Supreme
Court to its landmark judgment, in particular: (i) the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts to ascertain procedural challenges to the
12. Id. at 2761.
13. See id.
14. The Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") was established on July 7,
2004, after the U.S. Supreme Court determined in 2004 that Guantanamo Bay prison-
ers were entitled to petition the U.S. federal courts to assess the lawfulness of their
detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 484
(2004); see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (petitioner employed mecha-
nism of petition via the CSRT).
15. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
16. See id. at 2762.
17. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 168 (D.D.C. 2004).
18. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 425 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
19. See id. at 39.
20. See id.
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lawfulness of military commission proceedings; (ii) the relation
to the Geneva Convention; (iii) the aspect of conspiracy as a
(non-)legal basis for indictments issued before military commis-
sions, especially in the argument raised by the defense in the
Hamdan case; and (iv) the case law of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") with respect to the
concept of conspiracy and joint criminal enterprise ('ICE").
The case law of the ICTY, as this Article argues, is also relevant to
the interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tion. This Article also addresses the legal, political, and interna-
tional (criminal) law implications of the Hamdan decision and
examines the proposed New Code of Military Commissions
("CMC") for its compliance with international law.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONTRA-LEGEM
NATURE OF THE COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS
IN THE GUANTANAMO BAY CASES
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals decision by a majority of 5-3,21 heralding
major implications for the future of terrorism and unlawful com-
batancy proceedings. It held that the military commission pro-
ceedings instituted to try detainees held at Guantanamo do not
provide basic procedural and substantive legal safeguards. 22 Ad-
ditionally, the applicable rules of procedure and evidence were
disqualified as being contrary to norms of customary interna-
tional law. 21
The decision was occasioned after Hamdan had petitioned
for habeas corpus relief within the Federal Courts, arguing that
the military commissions as such were not authorized to try him
for the following reasons:
(i) Congressional authorization is absent for a military com-
mission to initiate a trial for conspiracy in connection with
violations of the law of war;
(ii) The rules of procedure and evidence operational
before military commissions promulgated by the Bush admin-
21. Chief Justice Roberts did not participate in the deliberations or decision be-
cause he had participated in the Hamdan decision while serving as a member of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit").
22. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2807.
23. See id. at 2797-98.
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istration are in contravention to evidentiary norms upheld by
court-martial proceedings and embedded within interna-
tional law, including the principle that a suspect should have
access to and be able to challenge the evidence against him;
and
(iii) The conspiracy charge lodged against Salim Hamdan
does not constitute a violation of the law of war in accordance
with principles of international law.24
These three arguments will be dealt with below.
A. Federal Court Jurisdiction over Hamdan's Claims
With respect to the first argument, it is important to observe
that the establishment of the military commissions by President
Bush in 2001 was not accompanied by explicit U.S. congressional
authorization. For Hamdan, this formed the first argument to
have his trial before this commission declared unconstitu-
tional.25 The U.S. Government's defense was that such legal in-
tervention would rupture the constitutional doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. The Government argued that the President has
inherent authority to convene the commissions as Commander
in Chief and, furthermore, that the power to establish the mili-
tary commissions originated indirectly from ajoint resolution of
Congress. 26 Recourse was made to a resolution, the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force, ("AUMF") authorizing the Presi-
dent "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, au-
thorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001 .... .. 27 It was argued that the term
"force" encompassed the authority for the President to establish
military commissions. 28
This reasoning was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court. 9
The justices ruled that the AUMF and the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice ("UCMJ") 31 can, at the most, only be seen as an over-
24. See id. at 2759.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 2773-74.
27. S.J. Res. 23, §2(a), 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
28. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
29. See id. at 2775.
30. The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") controls proceedings before
the U.S. courts-martial.
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all presidential authority to establish military commissions, pro-
vided that they are justified by the U.S. Constitution and the laws
of war. In the absence of any explicit authorization, federal
courts are empowered to assess whether the military commission
that is to try Hamdan is indeed founded in compliance with the
Constitution and the laws of war. 1
Consequently, such judicial control could not be seen as a
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. An important
implication of the Hamdan decision is that the authority of the
President to undertake certain measures in time of war is and
remains subject to judicial scrutiny. This reasoning can also be
extrapolated to other jurisdictions when judicial control and su-
pervision is circumvented in prosecuting unlawful combatants.
B. Military Commission Proceedings and Their Incompatibility
with the Third Geneva Convention
1. Applicability of Common Article Three
As to Hamdan's second argument, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the military commissions in the Hamdan case were, in
terms of both structure and procedure, in contravention of the
UCMJ as well as Common Article Three of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949, to which the United States acceded in
1995,32 observing that the procedures before the military com-
missions differ in a number of essential ways from U.S. court-
martial proceedings.33 For example, the rules of procedure and
evidence promulgated for said military commission proceedings
stipulate that:
The commission's procedures, set forth in Commission Or-
der No. 1, provide, among other things, that an accused and
his civilian counsel may be excluded from, and precluded
from ever learning what evidence was presented during, any
part of the proceeding the official who appointed the com-
mission or the presiding officer decides to "close." Grounds
for closure include the protection of classified information,
the physical safety of participants and witnesses, the protec-
tion of intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods,
or activities, and "other national security interests." Ap-
31. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775.
32. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
33. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2801-09.
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pointed military defense counsel must be privy to these
closed sessions, but may, at the presiding officer's discretion,
be forbidden to reveal to the client what took place therein.
Another striking feature is that the rules governing Hamdan's
commission permit the admission of any evidence that, in the
presiding officer's opinion, would have probative value to a
reasonable person. Moreover, the accused and his civilian
counsel may be denied access to classified and other "pro-
tected information," so long as the presiding officer con-
cludes that the evidence is "probative" and that its admission
without the accused's knowledge would not result in the de-
nial of a full and fair trial.34
The Bush Administration justified this divergent procedural rule
on the basis of the following two arguments. First, the govern-
ment argued that any jurisdictional or procedural challenges
should be raised by Hamdan when he appears before the mili-
tary commission itself. 5 The Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that such a challenge could not be evaluated in a judicial
phase beforehand, stating that the real issue is not a potential
violation of Hamdan's right to a fair trial, but the observation
that "[h]e will be, and indeed already has been, excluded from
his own trial."36 It is for this reason that the justices vindicated a
determination of the legality of military commissions proceed-
ings by a federal judge in anticipation of the commissions pro-
ceedings. Second, the U.S. Government argued that the military
commissions are different and distinct from a court-martial, and
thus structurally and inherently are entrusted with different pro-
cedural rules.3 7 Here, the justices observed that the procedures
for both type of processes were historically seen as the same, pre-
cisely to discourage abuse of rules in times when the government
was under the pressure of conducting a war.38 It thus pursued a
teleological interpretation of the military commission rules. In
particular, the Supreme Court held that Article 36 of the UCMJ
stipulates that the procedural rules developed by the President
for military court-martial and military commissions, must be uni-
form "insofar as practicable." 39 The Supreme Court concluded
34. See id. at 2755.
35. See id. at 2787.
36. Id. at 2788.
37. See id. at 2791.
38. See id. at 2788.
39. Id. at 2790 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006)).
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that this last requirement was not met now that the U.S. Govern-
ment failed to show that practical objections exist and, if so, what
they are, especially in reference to the handing over of evidence
to the suspect.4 ° It certainly did not meet the requirement "to
apply one of the most fundamental protections afforded not just
by the Manual for Court-Martial but also by the UCMJ itself: the
right to be present."41 Said teleological interpretation is evi-
denced by the reasoning of Justice Stevens: "Whether or not
that departure technically is 'contrary to or inconsistent with'
the terms of the UCMJ . . . the jettisoning of so basic a right
cannot lightly be excused as 'practicable."' 42 The Court arrives
at this conclusion in particular on the basis of the reasoning
that: "Nothing in the record before us demonstrates that it
would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case.
There is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in
securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in apply-
ing the usual principles of relevance and admissibility. '43 It is
thus no great surprise that, regarding practicability in the
Hamdan case, the Supreme Court concluded that "[u]nder the
circumstances, then, the rules applicable in court-martial must
apply. Since it is undisputed that Commission Order No. 1 devi-
ates in many significant respects from those rules, it necessarily
violates Article 36(b).""
2. Teleological Interpretation of Common Article Three
One of the most enlightening arguments underlying this
conclusion, illustrative of the elusiveness of the Supreme Court
ruling as a whole, lies in the determination that the rules of pro-
cedure and evidence applicable to military commissions are con-
trary to the fair trial principles envisioned by the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949, in particular Common Article Three. 45 The
ratio decidendi of the majority of the Supreme Court thereto rests
on four elements.
As to the Government's first argument that the Supreme
Court is not competent (authorized) to examine the procedures
40. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2796.
45. See id. at 2795-97.
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of the commissions in terms of their compatibility with the Ge-
neva Conventions, since only political and military authorities
are responsible for enforcement of these Conventions, the jus-
tices considered that, irrespective of the nature of the norms in
the Geneva Conventions, these are intrinsically part of the law of
war. Pursuant to Article 21 of the UCMJ this compatibility issue
is subjected to judicial scrutiny.4 6
Second, the U.S. Government argued that the Geneva Con-
ventions would not apply, since Hamdan was arrested during the
conflict with Al Qaeda-a party that has not ratified these Con-
ventions.4 7 In addition, it was argued that the conflict with Al
Qaeda should be distinguished from the war with Afghanistan,
who did accede to the Conventions.48 The justices refuted such
a distinction, holding that there is at least one Article of the Ge-
neva Conventions, namely Common Article Three, that applies
irrespective of whether the conflict is among States that ratified
the Conventions.49 Common Article Three appears in all four
Conventions, and stipulates, inter alia, that in a non-international
conflict on the territories of one of the signatory parties "each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum"
those provisions that offer protection to "persons... placed hors
de combat by . .. detention," including the prohibition on "the
passing of sentences . . . without previous judgment . . . by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
... recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."5" The con-
cept "regularly constituted court" is therefore interpreted restric-
tively by the Supreme Court in the Hamdan in the sense that, for
terrorism trials as well, a link must be sought with the procedural
rules that apply either for ordinary courts or military courts-mar-
tial.51 Furthermore, the justices opined that the conflict with Al
Qaeda is, contrary to the argument of the Bush Administration
in the Hamdan case, not a conflict with an international charac-
ter.52 Rather it can be seen as an internal armed conflict within
one and the same territory. Here, the Supreme Court relied
46. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793-94.
47. See id. at 2794-95.
48. See id. at 2795.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 2796
52. Id. at 2795.
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upon the rationale of Common Article Three, saying that "Com-
mon Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, fall-
ing short of full protection under the Conventions, to individu-
als associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory
'Power' who are involved in a conflict 'in the territory of' a signa-
tory."53
Next, confronted with the definitional question of what ex-
actly should be understood by a "regularly constituted court,"
the justices again followed a teleleological approach, holding
that, at a minimum, a military commission can be considered to
be regularly constituted according to standards of the U.S. mili-
tary justice system only if "some practical need explains deviation
from court-martial practice."54 As this burden of proof was not
met, this argument was resolved against the U.S. Government
position.55
In the same teleological vein, the Hamdan majority finally
opined that, although Common Article 3 to a large extent allows
flexibility in trying persons detained after an armed conflict, the
basic rights in this provision are nevertheless "requirements."56
In the view of the Court, the military commission that tried
Hamdan did not meet those requirements. 57
Summarizing the teleological approach in Hamdan, the fol-
lowing conclusions emerge:
First, the ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court ruling as to
the applicability and interpretation of Common Article Three of
the Geneva Conventions in terrorism and unlawful combatancy
cases expresses the primacy of this provision as a norm to ensure
a minimum standard of procedural fairness in this type of cases,
as a norm that should be effectuated on the basis of its rationale
and teleologically applied.
Second, although the justices do not specifically address the
doctrine of direct effect of the Geneva Convention as a whole for
individuals,58 they do not exclude such effect.59 At least for
53. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
54. Id. at 2797.
55. See id. at 2798.
56. See id.
57. See id. ("[B]ut requirements they are nonetheless.")
58. See id. at 2795.
59. In the Hamdan case, the D.C. Circuit held that the Geneva Conventions were
not legally enforceable for individuals involved in a criminal procedure. See Hamdan v.
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Common Article Three, this direct effect is now accepted.6 °
Third, the acceptance of this form of direct effect signifies
an ongoing precedent for the procedural approach on the basis
of which terrorism trials in the United States (and elsewhere)
ought to take place. It is to be expected that this decision will
also affect courts ofjustice or commissions abroad that might be
confronted with similar cases.
C. "Conspiracy" as a Contra-Legem Form of Criminality Within
International Criminal Law: A Jurisdictional Deficiency ?
1. The Justices' Approach
The Hamdan decision is important in yet another way. Four
of the Supreme Court justices touched upon a substantive law
matter which originated directly from international criminal law
principles. As observed supra, the charges against Hamdan were
based on the doctrine of conspiracy for acts committed between
1996 and November 2001.61 Only two months of this period re-
lated to the time after September 11, 2001. It is notable that the
elements underlying the conspiracy charge had not been de-
fined by the Congress, but by the President himself.6 2 In
Hamdan, the U.S. Supreme Court does not accept conspiracy as
a charge triable within the scope of the earlier mentioned third
category of military commissions-namely military commissions
intended to try violations of military law.6"
Two arguments were put forward in support of this conclu-
sion, arguments which have important precedential value and
may affect cases beyond the scope of military commission pro-
ceedings. First, the justices held that, according to Article XXI
of the UCMJ, the jurisdiction of military commissions of this cat-
egory is limited to offenses committed "within the theatre of
war," and those offenses must have been committed during the
armed conflict, not before or after.6 4 In the Hamdan case the
Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005), rev'd 126 S. Ct.
2749 (2006).
60. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d. 232, 242-44 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing appli-
cability of Geneva Convention Common Article III in regard to individuals in U.S.
courts).
61. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
62. Military Commission Instruction No. 2, 32 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2006).
63. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
64. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777.
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Court concluded that "neither the purported agreement with
Osama bin Laden and others to commit war crimes, nor a single
overt act is alleged to have occurred in a theatre of war or on any
specified date after September 11, 2001. ' ' 65 The Supreme Court
observed that "none of the overt acts that Hamdan is alleged to
have committed violates the law of war."6 6 Second, the Supreme
Court concluded that the offense of conspiracy is not triable by a
military commission of this category-i.e., a commission in-
tended to try violations of the law of war.6 7 Although it was con-
sidered that in theory a military commission is allowed to try of-
fenses that are not legally defined, such undefined offense must
at least be "plain and unambiguous" in its manifestation.68 Yet,
this requirement was not met.69 It is noteworthy that the offense
of conspiracy has rarely been tried before a U.S. military com-
mission of the third category, nor do the Geneva Conventions
mention this offense.70 In this regard, the justices were led by
international jurisprudence. They explicitly stated that "interna-
tional sources confirm that the crime charged here is not a rec-
ognized violation of the law of war," adding that "the only con-
spiracy crimes that have been recognized by international war
crimes tribunals . . . are conspiracy to commit genocide and
common plan to wage aggressive war, which is a crime against
the peace and requires for its commission actual participation in
a concrete plan to wage war."71
2. The Hamdan Defense Approach
The U.S. Supreme Court unambiguously relies on case law
of the ICTY. As a result, the justices implicitly endorse the trans-
position of ICTY jurisprudence onto its own law-making powers.
65. Id. at 2778.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 2785.
68. Id. at 2780.
69. See id.
70. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note 6; see also Capt. Brian C. Baldrate,
The Supreme Court's Role in Defining theJurisdtiction of Militay Tribunals: A Study, Critique,
& Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 186 MIL. L. REv. 1 (2005) (discussing the Hamdan
case and the rarity of conspiracy trials before military commissions).
71. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2784. Similarly, the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals do not acknowledge the participation form of conspiracy to commit
war crimes or crimes against the humanity. See Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-
99-37-AR72, Decision on Draguljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint
Criminal Enterprise (May 21, 2003).
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The Hamdan defense team argued for precisely this approach
before the U.S. Supreme Court, in order to support its argument
that conspiracy is not a triable offense before the military com-
missions. 72 Here, the defense of Hamdan was assisted by the le-
gal opinion drafted for these purposes ("Opinion Brief").7 The
Opinion Brief extensively elaborated on ICTY case law on con-
spiracy, analyzing several ICTYjudgments, in particular the Deci-
sion on Draguljub Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-
Joint Criminal Enterprise in the case of Prosecutor v. Milutinovic
("Ojdanic"), 74 which were put before the Supreme Court.
In Ojdanic, the Appeals Chamber categorically stated that
'joint criminal enterprise" ('ICE") and "conspiracy" are two dis-
tinct forms of liability, saying that:
[w] hilst conspiracy requires a showing that several individuals
have agreed to commit a certain crime of sets of crimes, a
UJCE] requires, in addition to such a showing, that the parties
to the agreement took action in furtherance of that agree-
ment. In other words, while the mere agreement is sufficient
in the case of conspiracy, the liability of a member of a .JCE]
will depend on the commission of criminal acts in further-
ance of that enterprise. 75
In the Ojdanic case, the Appeals Chamber also distinguished
JCE from organizational liability, holding that "[c] riminal liabil-
ity pursuant to a [JCE] is not a liability for mere membership or
for conspiring to commit crimes, but a form of liability con-
cerned with the participation in the commission of a crime as
part of a [JCE], a different matter."7 6 In this regard, the Appeals
Chamber emphasized that mere membership in a criminal or-
ganization or a JCE would not render the accused responsible
for crimes committed by that organization/JCE. The prosecu-
tion must establish that the accused actually contributed to the
72. See Legal Opinion on Joint Criminal Enterprise and Conspiracy, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Feb. 23 Legal Opinion] (on
file with author) (addressing ultra vires nature of conspiracy claims in this regard). This
opinion was produced by the author under a comfidentiality agreement with the
Hamdan defense team. The original is on file with the author and further questions
may be directed to him.
73. See Feb. 23 Legal Opinion, supra note 72.
74. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Draguljub
Ojdanic's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal Enterprise (May 21, 2003).
75. Id. 23.
76. Id. 26.
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realization of the common plan/purpose or acted in further-
ance of the common plan/purpose.7 7
Only when the charge concerns conspiracy to commit geno-
cide can the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") entertain jurisdiction.78 As yet, the ICTY has
not entered convictions on this basis-the only genocide convic-
tion upheld thus far was for aiding and abetting genocide, en-
dorsed by the Krstic Appeals Chamber judgment.79 In contrast,
conspiracy has played a greater role at the ICTR. Firstly, because
genocide has been much easier to prove in relation to the events
in Rwanda, and secondly, because conspiracy is the only offense
for which the ICTR Prosecutor is entitled to charge the accused
in regard to acts occurring prior to 1994.80
D. The Reliance of the Hamdan Defense on the Rationale for the
Rejection of Conspiracy Triable as a War Crime
In the Hamdan proceedings, the question arose as to the
rationale of the non-acceptance of conspiracy as a triable offense
per se.s l This issue was addressed in the Opinion Brief provided
to the Hamdan defense presented to the Supreme Court.8 2 It
posited two arguments for this rejection.
First, an argument was derived from the World War II
("WW-II") cases as well as the policy of the Allies relative to the
restoration of the peace. Because Germany, after WW-II, had
surrendered and was then occupied, it had relinquished its sov-
ereignty; it was therefore not possible to prosecute the German
State as such for breaching the WW-II peace treaties. Conspiracy
to commit aggression/crimes against peace was therefore in-
serted into the Charter in lieu of State responsibility.8"
Essentially, during WW-II, the Allies (i.e., the United King-
dom and United States) pursued the policy that anyone who
committed the listed acts (regarding breaching the peace treaty)
77. See id. 11 23, 26.
78. See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 65 (2003).
79. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
138 (Apr. 19, 2004).
80. See KIoops, supra note 78, at 80.
81. See Feb. 23 Legal Opinion, supra note 72.
82. See id.
83. See KRIANGSAK KITICHAISARREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 248-49 (2001).
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would be guilty of conspiracy." After the war, the United States
was keen to use conspiracy in order to cover Hitler's regime and
to prove that it was an illegal regime which had waged an illegal
war. The French and Russians were not involved in the original
discussions, but were allowed to participate later. The French
were still recovering from their occupation, so they seem to have
been at a disadvantaged position. 5
Based on this historical reconstruction, one can assume that
this was the reason why conspiracy was only accepted with re-
spect to crimes of aggression/crimes against peace and not with
respect to war crimes and crimes against humanity. These politi-
cal motivations seemed to be the primary reason thereto, as well
as the simple fact that Hitler had been put on notice of the in-
tention of the Allies to prosecute this conspiracy crime. Notably,
the French judge Henri Donnedieu de Vabres was opposed to
conspiracy as a notion because it was not a familiar concept
within civil law systems. 6 Judge Donnedieu de Vabres argued
that it was unknown to international law. One may assume that
his view as a judge was instrumental in avoiding the application
of conspiracy in the WW-II convictions.8 7
In the second place, a more contemporary argument was
developed by the Hamdan defense based upon an evaluation of
the statute of the ICTY. Article VI of this statute provides that
the international tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural
persons.88 All persons are, therefore, subject to the personal ju-
risdiction of the tribunal, with the exclusion of legal persons,
organizations and States. 9 The possibility of extending the per-
sonal jurisdiction of the ICTY to organizations for the purpose of
establishing membership therein as an offense was discarded.
The Nuremberg precedent, whereby a declaration of criminality
of an organization by the Military Tribunal fixed the criminality
of its members in subsequent proceedings before national courts
of the signatory parties, could thus not have been followed in the
84. See Symposium, Critical Perspectives on The Nuremberg Trials, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 453, 495 (1995).
85. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 75-77 (1992).
86. See TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 581-82.
87. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 197 (2003).
88. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 6,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
89. See KNooPs, supra note 78, at 4.
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ICTY context. This was not only because a similar hierarchical
structure between the international tribunal and national courts
could not have been envisaged, but mainly because the notion of
guilt by association, implicit in the crime of membership, does
not comport with the underlying principle of the ICTY statute
that criminal liability is personal.9 °
As a result, the ICTY Statute does not even retain the notion
of conspiracy that was recognized by the Nuremburg Tribunal as
a specific offense.9 The Statute only recognizes conspiracy in
relation to crimes against peace. 92 Instead, premised on the
principle of individual criminal liability, the ICTY Statute retains
the notion of complicity, which entails the individual criminal
responsibility of the accused for acts done by him to the extent
of his contribution to the execution of the crime.93 Hence, the
aforementioned Opinion Brief, which was instrumental to the
Hamdan defense team in their oral arguments brought before
the Supreme Court in March 2006, arrived at the conclusion
that several legal political as well as doctrinal reasons are availa-
ble to show why the doctrine of conspiracy is an unsuitable liabil-
ity concept when it concerns war crimes.
E. Conspiracy Under the International Criminal Court Statute:
An Additional Defense Argument
In Hamdan, the U.S. Government's submissions relied on
Article 25(3) (d) of the International Criminal Court ("ICC")
Statute to support its argument that a form of conspiracy has
been included in the ICC Statute.9 4 Notably, the concept of
90. For further elucidation of these arguments, see Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zack-
lin, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 E.J.I.L. 360, 369-70
(1994). For these reasons both New Zealand and Belgium in their submissions to the
U.N. Secretary-General expressed opposition to including membership in criminal or-
ganization as an offense under the Statute.
91. See ICTY Statute, supra note 88, art. 4(3) (b).
92. See id.
93. See id. arts. 7(1), 7(2).
94. This provision reads:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
person: . .. (d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common pur-
pose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made
with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime
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joint criminal enterprise as such is not implemented within the
ICC Statute.
The Opinion Brief, on which the Hamdan defense relied,
refuted this argument, advocating the following arguments. As a
preliminary point, the Brief observed that, unlike the ad hoc
Tribunals, the ICC is a treaty-based institution; thus, the drafters
of the ICC Statute only needed to gain the consent of the States
Parties-it was not necessary for them to establish that the of-
fenses codified in the ICC Statute were reflective of customary
international law or conventional law, which was applicable to all
the State Parties.
9 5
Second, it argued that the fact that 104 States have now rati-
fied the Statute offers evidence of wide-spread opiniojuris regard-
ing the Statute's provisions.9 6 In order to respect the principle
of legality, however, the ICC Statute explicitly states that it can-
not be applied retroactively to offenses that occurred either
before the ICC Statute came into effect in July 2002, or before
the States Parties with jurisdiction over the offense ratified the
ICC.9 7 At the time Hamdan committed the alleged offenses, the
ICC Statute had not been ratified by either the United States,
Yemen, or Afghanistan.9"
Third, while the inclusion of certain provisions in the ICC
Statute (such as Article 25) is not evidence in and of itself that
these provisions are customary international law, the fact that
delegations of several States objected to the inclusion of certain
offenses or forms of liability is evidence there was no consistent
within the jurisdiction of the court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the
intention of the group to commit the crime.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(d), A/CONF. 183/9, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (July 17, 1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Rome Statute].
95. See Feb. 23 Legal Opinion, supra note 72.
96. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment 1 223 (July 15, 1999), the
Appeals Chamber opined noted that the:
Statute was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States attending the
Rome Diplomatic Conference and was substantially endorsed by the Sixth
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly ... shows that that text is
supported by a great number of States and may be taken to express the legal
position i.e. opiniojuris of those States.
97. See Rome Statute, supra note 94, arts. 22(1), 24(1).
98. Afghanistan deposited its instrument of accession to the Rome Statute on Feb-
ruary 10, 2003. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties (Afghani-
stan), http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties/country&id=41.html (last visited Jan.
22, 2007).
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State practice and opinio juris as of 1998 in relation to these of-
fenses or forms of liability.99 In this regard, in light of the fact
that conspiracy is not recognized by several civil law countries, it
was not included in the ICC Statute.100 Thus, in contrast to the
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, which incorporate the offense of
conspiracy to commit genocide based on the wording of the Ge-
nocide Convention, the operative Article governing genocide in
the ICC Statute1 °1 only lists completed acts of genocide as of-
fenses under the Statute. This suggests that the consensus that
existed in 1948 with respect to conspiracy to commit genocide as
an inchoate offense no longer exists among the principal legal
systems of the world.
Furthermore, the aforementioned Opinion Brief elucidated
that the form of liability set out in Article 25 (3) (d) differs from
the form of conspiracy set out in Military Instruction No. 2
("MCI No.2") in several key aspects. 10 2
First, in contrast with MCI No. 2, which only requires that a
member of the conspiracy/enterprise (not necessarily the ac-
cused) commit an overt act in furtherance of the common pur-
pose, Article 25(3) (d) requires that the accused must contribute
to the commission or attempted commission of the crime.
10 3
Hence, in contrast to MCI No. 2, the mere fact that an accused
may have been a member of the conspiracy or enterprise and
may have known of their criminal objectives is not sufficient to
establish criminal responsibility under this Article. The use of
the word "contribute" also suggests that the action of the ac-
cused should form part of the causal nexus of the commission of
the crime (or attempted crime).104 Indirect acts, such as ensur-
ing the general safety of Osama Bin Laden, would not meet this
criteria.
Second, the accused must intentionally contribute to the
commission of a specific crime within the ICC Statute, and he
must do so either with the aim of furthering the criminal activ-
99. See Feb. 23 Legal Opinion, supra note 72.
100. See CASSESE, supra note 87, at 196; MARKJENNINGS, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR
THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE PROCEDURAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT 6 (2001), http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Jennings.pdf (last visited Jan. 22,
2007).
101. See Rome Statute, supra note 94, art. 6.
102. See Feb. 23 Legal Opinion, supra note 72.
103. See Rome Statute, supra note 94, art. 25(3)(d).
104. See KIrICHAISARREE, supra note 83, at 250.
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ity/purpose of the group (provided that the activity/purpose in-
volves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the
court) or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit a crime within the jurisdiction of the court. 10 5 From this
it can be extrapolated that the prosecution must establish at the
very least that the accused possessed personal knowledge of the
specific crime under the ICC Statute that the group of persons
intended to commit.10 6 In accordance with the ICC Statute
formula, it would not be sufficient that the accused was only
aware of the general criminal purpose of the group. Moreover,
since the ICC Statute stipulates that the accused must "intend"
to contribute, it is arguable that the accused would need to have
known sufficient details of the criminal plan or activity to be
aware that his actions would contribute to the commission or
attempted commission of that specific crime.10 7
Third, it is notable that the extended form of JCE (third
category), was not included in the ICC Statute. Article 25(3) (d)
requires the prosecution to establish that the accused actually
contributed to the commission/attempted commission of the
crime charged, and that he either shared the intention of the
perpetrators to commit that specific offense, or had actual
knowledge of the group's intended commission or attempted
commission of that specific crime.'0 8
Finally, although there is no express requirement in the Ar-
ticle for the prosecution to establish that the accused possessed
an agreement or understanding with the actual physical perpe-
trators of the offense, in the absence of any jurisprudence de-
lineating the parameters of this Article, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the procedural limitations placed on JCE by the ICTY
may be adopted by the ICC. In this regard, Article 21 of the ICC
Statute provides that, after first consulting the Statute and rules
and regulations of the court, the court may apply the applicable
principles of international law.' In view of the fact that the
105. See Rome Statute, supra note 94, art. 25(3)(d).
106. See KITriCHAISARREE, supra note 83, at 241.
107. Article 30(2)of the Rome Statute provides that "a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that conse-
quence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
See Rome Statute, supra note 94, art. 30(2).
108. See id. art. 25(3)(d).
109. See id. art. 21(1).
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respective chambers of the ICTY have argued that the limitations
they have placed on the theory of JCE derive from customary
international law, the ICC might also adopt their conclusions.
As a result, the Hamdan case, led by the Opinion Brief, arrived at
the conclusion that it would therefore be premature to cite Arti-
cle 25 (3) (d) in support of a broad definition of conspiracy/com-
plicity under international law. The U.S. Supreme Court implic-
itly acknowledged this reasoning.
F. The Hamdan Defense: Distinguishing Conspiracy From Joint
Criminal Enterprise Under ICTY Jurisprudence
The Opinion Brief provided to the Hamdan defense for the
purpose of the Supreme Court proceedings also delved deeper
into the fundamental distinction between the concept of con-
spiracy and the concept of joint criminal enterprise, which was
developed by the judges of the ICTY. Noticeably, the latter con-
cept was not specifically promulgated by the Statute of the ICTY
in 1993, but developed from case law of the ICTY.
The two most important judgments at the ICTY on the topic
of JCE are the Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment of July 15, 1999
(" TadicJudgment"), 0 and the Brdjanin Trial Judgment of Septem-
ber 1, 2004 ("BrdjaninJudgment").t 1 The TadicJudgment was the
first occasion on which the ICTY elaborated on the subject of
JCE (or common purpose as it was designated then). As an appeals
judgment, it is binding on the respective trial chambers. Al-
though the Judgment is not per se binding on domestic or other
international courts and tribunals, to the extent that it seeks to
ground its conclusions in customary international law, it is an
influential statement of the status of that law as of 1991-1995.112
The Brdjanin Judgment is particularly relevant to the Military
Commission indictments, because it seeks to limit the scope of
JCE, particularly in the scenario of large scale enterprises entail-
ing broad temporal and geographic spans.'1 3 The other judg-
ments referred to below clarify certain aspects of JCE and indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for war crimes.
The TadicJudgment is considered to be the primary author-
110. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999).
111. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-34-T, Trial judgement (Sept. 1, 2004).
112. See CASSESE, supra note 87, at 349-53.
113. See Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-34-T, 1 355.
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ity for the concept of common purpose at the ICTY. The facts con-
cerned the ethnic cleansing of the village of Jaskici, in which
Tadic participated." 4 Five men were taken to a river bank and
shot that day, but the prosecution was unable to establish who
pulled the trigger."' During trial, Tadic was acquitted of these
murders, but on appeal the Appeals Chamber found that there
was a joint criminal enterprise to cleanse the village.' 16 Tadic
shared this intention and participated in this cleansing. In addi-
tion, the Chamber held that the killing of the five men was a
foreseeable consequence of the JCE, and that Tadic had volunta-
rily participated in the JCE, knowing that such killings were a
foreseeable consequence of the ethnic cleansing." 7 The Ap-
peals Chamber therefore convicted Tadic of the five murders.
In terms of the legal theory, from the outset, the TadicJudg-
ment emphasized that criminal liability should be based on indi-
vidual participation/responsibility: "nobody may be held crimi-
nally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not per-
sonally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena
sine culpa)."" i The Appeals Chamber cites several national con-
stitutions that set out this principle. It references Article 7(1) of
the ICTY Statute regarding the principle of individual responsi-
bility and the Report of the Secretary General accompanying the
text of the ICTY Statute (analogous to the travaux preparatoires of
the ICTY Statute), in which the Secretary-General states that the
law applied by the ICTY should be founded on customary inter-
national law, and that its competence ratione personae (personal ju-
risdiction) should extend only to individuals and not to
groups. '
It can be extrapolated from these clear caveats that the Ap-
peals Chamber did not intend for this form of liability to extend
to impose responsibility for membership in a criminal group-a
form of collective as opposed to individual responsibility. Al-
though the Appeals Chamber does reference the notion of col-
114. See Prosecuter v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Indictment (Amended), 12
(Dec. 14, 1995).
115. See Prosecuter v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 373
(May 7, 1997).
116. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
231 (July 15, 1999).
117. See id. 231-232.
118. Id. 1 186.
119. See id.
620 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:599
lective criminality at paragraph 191,120 it further elaborates that,
by the use of this term, the Appeals Chamber is referring to a
scenario in which "[a] lthough only some members of the group
may physically perpetrate the criminal act (murder, extermina-
tion, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, etc.), the
participation and contribution of the other members of the
group is often vital in facilitating the commission of the offense
in question."1 21
Since the ICTY Statute does not set out the requirements
for the elements of the actus reus and mens rea, the Appeals
Chamber relied on customary international law as set out in in-
ternational legislation and case law (WW-II jurisprudence and
domestic jurisprudence). 12 2 The Appeals Chamber concluded
that these cases illustrated three different categories of JCE, de-
fined as described below.
The first category concerns co-defendants who possess the
same criminal intention-i.e., to achieve the goal of the joint
criminal enterprise-but not all of whom have the same role in
carrying out the criminal goal. All participants in the JCE may
nonetheless be convicted of the crime that was the goal of the
JCE if the following is established: (i) the accused must volunta-
rily participate in one aspect of the common design (for in-
stance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the victim, or by
providing material assistance to or facilitating the activities of his
co-perpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally ef-
fecting the killing, must nevertheless intend this result. 123
With respect to the nature of the accused's participation-
citing the Ponzano case, 124 the Appeals Chamber concluded that
the accused's contribution to the common plan/purpose must
have been a link in the chain of causation vis-A-vis the ultimate
120. Id. 1 191.
Most of the time these crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of
single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the
crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a
common criminal design.
121. Id.
122. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
194 (July 15, 1999).
123. See id. 196.
124. See id. 1 199 (discussing Trial of Feurstein and Others, Proceedings of a War
Crimes Trial Held at Hamburg, Germany (Aug. 4-24, 1948), Judgment of August 24,
1948).
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offense-although not that it was the sine qua non, i.e., that but
for the accused's contribution, the common plan would not
have been achieved. 125 The Chamber referred to the Trial of
Otto Sandrock and Three Others,1 26 the Trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen
and Others,127 the Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Others,1 21 the Trial of
Feurstein and Others,12 9 and United States v. Otto Ohlenforf,' ° as ex-
am ples of this first category.
The second category ofJCE, a variant of the first, is applica-
ble where offenses charged were alleged to have been commit-
ted by members of military or administrative units such as those
running concentration camps; i.e., by groups of persons acting
pursuant to a concerted plan. 13' In fleshing out the details of
this category, the Trial Chamber relied on the Dachau Concentra-
tion Camp case 3 2 and the Belsen case.'
The elements of this category were as follows:
(a) Actus reus: satisfied by active participation in the en-
forcement of a system of repression." 4 This participation could
be inferred from the position of authority and specific functions
of the accused.1 15 This implies that an accused who did not ex-
ercise a position of authority (e.g., driver or cook) or whose
functions were not actively/directly linked to the system of re-
pression would not fall within the scope of this category.
(b) Mens rea: satisfied if the accused possessed (i) knowl-
edge of the nature of the system; and (ii) the intent to further
the common concerted design of ill-treatment (in camps or sys-
125. See id.
126. See id. 197 (discussing Proceedings of British Military Court for the Trial of
War Criminals, Held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland (Nov. 24-26, 1945)).
127. See id. 198 (discussing Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial Held at Luneberg,
Germany (Aug. 13-23, 1946), Judgment of August 24, 1946).
128. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals ChamberJudgment (dis-
cussing Proceedings of British Military Court, Essen (June 11-26, 1946)).
129. See id. 199 (discussing Proceedings of a War Crimes Trial Held at Hamburg,
Germany (Aug. 4-24, 1948), Judgment of August 24, 1948).
130. See id. 200 (discussing trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals).
131. See id. 202.
132. See id. (discussing Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-nine Others,
General Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany (Nov.
15-Dec. 13, 1945).
133. See id. (discussing Trial ofJosef Kramer and Forty-four Others, British Military
Court, Luneberg (Sept. 17-Nov. 17, 1945)).
134. See id.
135. See id. 203.
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tem) 136
With respect to the issue of intent, the Appeals Chamber
held that, in many of the concentration camp cases, the ac-
cused's intent could be inferred from the position of authority
of the accused if the accused exercised a high level of authority
such that it would evidence the accused's knowledge of the sys-
tem of ill-treatment and intention to further it.'3 7 It is, however,
arguable that it would not be possible to infer intent if the ac-
cused was, for example, a cook or a cleaner, who would not nec-
essarily know the details of the system of ill-treatment or would
not necessarily have the ability to actively influence the system of
ill-treatment. Accordingly, the fact that they continue to per-
form their functions within the system is not necessarily indica-
tive of their intention to further the criminal purpose of the sys-
tem.
The third category of JCE, the extended form of JCE, is es-
sentially based on the classic bank robbery scenario, i.e., three
people agree to rob a bank (which is the common purpose), one
of them is armed, the bank is guarded, the other two are aware
of these factors, but nonetheless participate. During the course
of the robbery, there is a struggle; and someone is shot and
killed. In the extended form of JCE, all participants in the rob-
bery are liable for the death because it was a natural and foresee-
able consequence of their decision to rob the bank. 3 '
The Appeals Chamber applied this form of liability in the
context of a conflict and gave the example of:
a common, shared intention on the part of a group to forci-
bly remove members of one ethnicity from their town, village
or region (to effect "ethnic cleansing") with the consequence
that, in the course of doing so, one or more of the victims is
shot and killed. While murder may not have been explicitly
acknowledged to be part of the common design, it was never-
theless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at
gunpoint might well result in the deaths of one or more of
those civilians. 39
In this scenario, all participants in the ethnic cleansing will
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See CASSESE, supra note 87, at 187-88.
139. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 204
(July 15, 1999).
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be liable for the resulting deaths "where the risk of death occur-
ring was both a predictable consequence of the execution of the
common design and the accused was either reckless or indiffer-
ent to that risk."' 4 ° Although the use of the word "predictable"
has been criticized in subsequent judgments 4 ' and by commen-
tators142 as being unduly ambiguous, it is arguable that its use
implies that there must be some kind of relationship between
the accused and the physical perpetrator of the criminal act, and
that the proximity of this relationship was such that the accused
was in a position to predict the specific actions of the actual
physical perpetrator. This would only have been the case if
there was an actual agreement (whether express, implied, or ex-
temporaneous) between the accused and the physical perpetra-
tor regarding their respective roles in the alleged JCE.
The Appeals Chamber subsequently notes that cases falling
under this category during the WW-II prosecutions concerned
mob violence, such as the Borkum Island case (Kurt Goebell et
al.)143 and the Essen Lynching case. 14 4 It is, however, important
to distinguish between mob violence cases in which the scenario
is that the mob all shared the same intention (i.e., to lynch some-
one), but it is difficult to ascertain which member of the mob
struck the killing blow, which would properly fall under the first
category of JCE, and the scenario in which the mob shares the
intention to loot/plunder, etc. while armed, and it is foreseeable
that violence to life might ensue in the course of this armed loot-
ing and plundering, which would fall under the third category.
The Appeals Chamber's reliance on "mob violence" cases to
demonstrate the third category is therefore misleading.
The analysis of the Appeals Chamber of war crimes cases
brought before Italian courts (the Court of Cassation) after WW-
II is particularly relevant to the framing of the offenses in the
Hamdan indictment.145 The Appeals Chamber examined the
Italian Court of Cassation's findings with respect to the causal
140. Id.
141. See Prosecutor v. Ojdaniae, et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Separate Opinion
of Judge David Hunt on Challenge by Ojdaniae to Jurisdiction (May 21, 2003).
142. See Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CAL. L. REv. 75 (2005).
143. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 1 210-12.
144. See id. It 207-09.
145. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 11 214-19.
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nexus between the JCE and the offense in the Mannelli judg-
ment of July 20, 1949. The court explained the required causal
nexus as follows:
The relationship of material causality by virtue of which the
law makes some of the participants liable for the crime other
than that envisaged, must be correctly understood from the
viewpoint of logic and law and be strictly differentiated from
an incidental relationship (rapporto di occasionalita). Indeed,
the cause, whether immediate or mediate, direct or indirect,
simultaneous or successive, can never be confused with mere
coincidence. For there to be a relationship of material cau-
sality between the crime willed by one of the participants and
the different crime committed by another, it is necessary that
the latter crime should constitute the logical and predictable develop-
ment of the former (il logico e prevedibile sviluppo del primo). In-
stead, where there exists full independence between the two
crimes, one may find, depending upon the specific circum-
stances, a merely incidental relationship (un rapporto di mera
occasionalita), but not a causal relationship. In the light of
these criteria, he who requests somebody else to wound or kill
cannot answer for a robbery perpetrated by the other person,
for this crime does not constitute the logical development of
the intended offense, but a new fact, having its own causal
autonomy, and linked to the conduct willed by the instigator
(mandante) by a merely incidental relationship. 146
A further factor taken into consideration by the Italian
Court of Cassation was whether-in an extendedJCE scenario-
the crime, which was the by-product of the initial JCE, was more
serious than the intended objective of the JCE.14 7 For example,
if, in the course of committing a "mopping up" operation, some-
one commits the far more serious offense of homicide, in order
to find the other participants in the mopping up incident culpa-
ble, "it was necessary to establish that, in participating in this op-
eration, a voluntary activity also concerning homicide had been
brought into being (fosse stata spiegata un 'attivitd volontaria in rela-
zione anche all'omicidio)."148 The reference to "voluntary activity
also concerning homicide" implies that, for individual A to be
convicted of a more serious offense that has been perpetrated by
146. Id. 218 (citing Giustizia Penale, 1950, Part II, cols. 696-697).
147. See id. 216 (citing handwritten text of unpublished judgment in re Beraschi,
on file with ICTY library).
148. Id.
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another participant (individual B) in the JCE, it is necessary to
demonstrate that individual A was able to predict in advance that
the commission of acts of such gravity was a possible and foresee-
able consequence of undertaking the JCE, and nonetheless, vol-
untarily and intentionally continued to participate in the JCE.
Indeed, in summing up the elements for the third category of
JCE, the Appeals Chamber further clarified that: "more than
negligence is required. What is required is a state of mind in
which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a
certain result, was aware that the actions of the group were most
likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took that
risk."' 4 9 In conclusion, now that the concept of JCE fundamen-
tally differs from "conspiracy" under principles of international
criminal law, the Hamdan defense was able to challenge the U.S.
government's arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court on this
issue.
G. Projection from the Hamdan Case
In the context of Hamdan, the Supreme Court accepted that
the jurisdiction of the military commission does not encompass
conspiracy, and that the commission therefore lacked the au-
thority to try Hamdan.' 50 As a consequence, the Supreme Court
in fact transformed a deficiency rationae materiae exposed by the
indictment into a jurisdictional deficiency.
By doing so, the justices actually introduce a criterion that
seems applicable to all types of proceedings similar to military
commissions: that of military necessity. They considered that
the charge against Hamdan did not only contain procedural de-
fects. Rather, they held that such defects were also indicative of
a broader failure on the part of the U.S. government to meet the
most fundamental requirements for establishing such commis-
sions: that of military necessity. Quite revealing are the consid-
erations of the five Supreme Court justices who voted in favor of
Hamdan-that this "tribunal was appointed not by a military
commander in the field of battle, but by a retired major general
stationed away from any active hostilities."' 51
149. Id. 1 220.
150. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2785 (2006).
151. Id.
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III. THE DIRECT EFFECT AND INDIVIDUAL ENFORCEABILITY
OF THE (THIRD) GENEVA CONVENTION(S) WITHIN
(INTERNATIONAL) CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
A. The (International) Legal Standing of Common Article Three
One of the pivotal questions central to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
was whether the Geneva Conventions create, for those accused
of and charged with violations of the law of war, a direct effect,
so that these persons can utilize the conventions in their de-
fense. In Hamdan, this question was initially answered in the af-
firmative by the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. 1 52 However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal for the D.C.
Circuit held the opposite.15 1
The U.S. Supreme Court abstained from answering this
question, saying that "[w] e need not decide the merits of this
argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva
Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not
one between signatories."' 5 4 In doing so, they left open the
question whether an accused like Hamdan can directly rely on
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions within the legal pro-
cess. On February 7, 2002, the U.S. President indicated that the
Geneva Conventions were applicable to the conflict with the
Taliban regime, which at that time ruled Afghanistan.1 55 No
such acknowledgement was made for members of Al Qaeda.
The Supreme Court justices, however, set forth the notion that
unlawful combatants can directly rely on the fair trials provision
of the Geneva Conventions. Preceding this ruling, Common Ar-
ticle Three was perceived to have this effect on the basis of (cus-
tomary) international law on the following bases:
First, the Third Geneva Convention is deemed self-execut-
ing, i.e., it can be called upon directly in domestic trial proceed-
ings, and it requires no legislation for its implementation, as the
stipulated norms are sufficiently clear and precise to be directly
applicable within a State's criminal process. 56 It is noteworthy
152. See id. at 2761-62.
153. See id. at 2762; see also Neil Richardson & Spencer Crona, Detention of Terrorists
as Unlawful Combatants and Their Trial by American Military Commissions, in LAW IN THE
WAR ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 123, 123-43 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 2005).
154. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
155. Id. at 2795 n.6 0 .
156. See T.D. Gill & E. van Sliedregt, Guantdnamo Bay: A Reflection on the Legal Sta-
tus and Rights of "Unlawful Enemy Combatants," 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 28 (2005).
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that during the ratification by the United States of the Third Ge-
neva Convention in 1955, the U.S. Congress argued that some
provisions required implementation, but this was only with re-
spect to those articles that concerned the severity of punish-
ment.157 Furthermore, the United States listed no reservations
at the time of ratifying the Third Geneva Convention.
Second, ICTY case law qualifies Common Article Three as
part and parcel of customary international law.'1
8
Third, according to an ICTY Trial Chamber decision of May
29, 1998, as well as the ICTY Appeals Chamber judgment in the
Delalic case, the norms embodied in Common Article Three ap-
ply "in all situations of armed conflict. " 159 These rulings are in
line with the opinion of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, in which
the ICJ decided that Common Article Three contains minimum
rules, applicable to every armed conflict, irrespective of whether
the conflict had an internal (domestic) or international charac-
ter.' 60 Thus, any dispute regarding whether an internal conflict
features in a certain case is superfluous when it concerns the
direct applicability of this provision on the basis of international
law.
It is without dispute that Common Article Three, as now ac-
knowledged by the Supreme Court in the Hamdan case, has a
self-executing effect on terrorism and unlawful combatancy pro-
cedures. The principle also applies to situations wherein the
conflict only involves armed factions that are not affiliated with a
particular State. Hamdan endorses the view that a particular al-
leged terrorist organization, which does not qualify as a State in
accordance with international law and thus is not party to the
Geneva Conventions, can have recourse to the procedural re-
quirements of Common Article Three. This view is vindicated by
the rationale that, "whether detained or prosecuted, unlawful
157. See Richardson & Crona, supra note 153.
158. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Opinion and
Judgment, 1 609 (May 7, 1997); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 11 164-174 (Nov. 16, 1998).
159. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Decision on the Defen-
dant's Motion to Dismiss Counts 13 and 14 of the Indictment (Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction), (May 29, 1998); Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals
Chamber, Judgment, 11 140-150 (Feb. 20, 2001).
160. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 114 (lune
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combatants must not be deemed beyond the ambit of law.' 1 61
Indeed, when one accepts that the text of Common Article
Three "reflects an irreducible minimum that no State is allowed
to ratchet down even a notch in any armed conflict (whether
international or non-international),"162 this view is justified.
In conclusion, it is established that the protective nature of
the Geneva Conventions lies in their self-executing effect contin-
gent upon the location of the conflict, and not so much on the
nature and characterization of the factions to which an alleged
terrorist or warrior is connected. 163 In a situation where several
fighting parties or factions are involved, it is conceivable that
these parties are associated with each other or with a certain
State, the result being that the Geneva Conventions apply. This
can, for example, occur when a particular State exerts such a
control over certain militia that their actions can be imputed to
that particular State. 1
64
B. The Distinctive Entitlements to Common Article Three
and to Prisoners of War Status
The above conclusion is not to say that Taliban troops are
endowed with a prisoner of war status. The ability to invoke
Common Article Three should not be confused with entitlement
to prisoner of war status under the laws of war, as the applicabil-
ity of Common Article Three to unlawful combatants does not
automatically denote prisoner of war status under the Third Ge-
neva Convention. Since all armed forces, under the law of inter-
national armed conflict, are obliged to wear uniforms or display
some other fixed distinctive emblem, it is questionable whether
unlawful combatants can claim a prisoner of war status under
said laws.1 65 The same counts for Al Qaeda fighters, although
less doubt seems to exist here as to the non-attribution of a pris-
oner of war status to them.16 6 Notwithstanding the notion that
161. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 32 (2005).
162. Id.
163. See Richardson & Crona, supra note 153.
164. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 114.
165. See DINSTEIN, supra note 161, at 48. Dinstein describes seven requirements for
the acceptance of this status, the second of which pertains to having a fixed distinct
emblem recognizable at a distance. See id. at 36-41.
166. See id. at 49.
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unlawful combatants are not eo ipso entitled to a prisoner of war
status, 167 the applicability of Common Article Three ensures at
the least humane treatment and legal protection of fundamental
principles of fair trial to all parties to the conflict, irrespective of
any belligerent State's standing as to the scope of the jus ad bel-
lum. It can be said, however, that the incongruence between fair
trial protection for prisoners of war and for unlawful combatants
has been diminished by Hamdan.
TV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE HAMDAN DECISION
Hamdan will implicitly have legal political implications as to
the ambit of Common Article Three. Firstly, from the perspec-
tive of the United States' internal legal politics, this decision cre-
ates clarity for the 450 Guantanamo Bay detainees regarding the
fair trial principles originating from Common Article Three.
Secondly, it endorses the customary international law status of
these principles, raising them to the level of a jus cogens norm.
Had the decision been different, it is conceivable that foreign
regimes or States would have been led by such a negative prece-
dent of the Supreme Court to promulgate similar military com-
mission trials without adherence to the principles of Common
Article Three. This would have led to a further deterioration of
the fair trial protection pertinent to terrorism and unlawful com-
batancy trials. This effect is now prevented in view of preceden-
tial value of Hamdan, as it effectively declared military commis-
sion proceedings in their current form illegal.
Aside from these internal legal political implications, the
Hamdan case implicates international legal political conse-
quences. This decision in fact implies that, even in times of
armed conflict when governments are under pressure to take ac-
tion, they remain not only bound and limited by their own do-
mestic constitution; but also by the dictates of international law.
The executive power within a State thus can neither deviate
from fundamental procedural guarantees, even while combating
terrorism and prosecuting unlawful combatants, nor can it avoid
judicial control. In this sense, the Hamdan decision consolidates
and reaffirms the doctrine of separation of powers in that the
executive power cannot independently set up legal proceedings
167. See id. at 50.
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during armed conflict that are not subject to judiciary control.
This was evidenced by the rejection of the Bush Administration
argument that the power to subject enemy combatants to a
State's own specific terrorism legislation would inherently flow
from the power of the President himself.168 Because such rea-
soning would result in a circumvention of basic fair trial rights, it
was rejected.
V. HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD: EXPONENT OF THE
A NA TAGONIS TIC VALUES OF THE RULE OF LAW
AND COMBATTING TERRORISM
The Hamdan decision also exemplifies the constant struggle
to find a proper balance between the interests of the executive
power of a State combating terrorism on the one hand, and the
responsibility of the judiciary to protect fundamental rights and
freedoms that are at stake as a result of combating terrorism on
the other hand. The discord between the justices of the Su-
preme Court in Hamdan is illustrative of this antagonistic situa-
tion.'6 9 A feature of these antagonistic positions within U.S. soci-
ety is reflected in a remark made by former Associate White
House Counsel Bradford A. Berenson after Hamdan: "What is
truly radical is the Supreme Court's willingness to bend to world
opinion and undermine some of the most important founda-
tions of American national security law in the middle of a
war." 170 Berenson's view reflects a tendency in the United States
to shift the balance in the fight against terrorism in favor of the
executive power, so that judicial control over the executive
power with respect to terrorism legislation should be limited to
only an extremely marginal form of judicial review. It is a view
that assumes that the effort to obtain intelligence by means of
detention centers like Guantanamo Bay and anti-terrorism pro-
cedures utilizing military commissions to prevent terrorist at-
tacks and punish terrorists ought not to be waylaid by judicial
review. The Hamdan decision supersedes and vitiates this view,
as the Supreme Court imposes various necessary restrictions
168. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774-75 (2006).
169. Three U.S. Supreme Court Justices gave a dissenting opinion in which they
distanced themselves, in scathing terms, from the majority decision of their colleagues.
See id. at 2810-55.
170. See David E. Sanger & Scott Shane, Court's Ruling Is Likely to Force Negotiations
over Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A21.
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thereto. Yet, it must be observed that the Hamdan ruling does
not say anything about the legitimacy of detention centers like
Guantanamo Bay per se, or the authority of the President and/or
the executive power to set up stringent measures to combat ter-
rorism. It only holds that such regulations should remain within
the ambit of the U.S. Constitution and international law parame-
ters, in particular, the Geneva Conventions. In this sense, the
Supreme Court consolidates some discretion for the executive to
prioritize national security law, albeit under strict circumstances
and conditions.
VI. INTERNATIONAL (CRIMINAL) LAW IMPLICATIONS OF
THE HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD CASE ON THE PROLIFERATION
OF ANTI-TERRORISM CASES
Hamdan was deemed a considerable setback for the Bush
administration in the area of combating terrorism and the prose-
cution of unlawful combatants.'71 It was not the first one for this
administration. In 2004, the Supreme Court rejected the U.S.
government's argument that the Guantanamo Bay detainees
were not entitled to petition for habeas corpus review of the law-
fulness of their detention before the federal courts.1 7 2 Immedi-
ately after Hamdan was decided, President Bush stated that his
administration would respect the Supreme Court's decision, ex-
pressing his desire to consult with the U.S. Congress in order to
ascertain an adjusted or new form of trial proceedings for the
Guantanamo Bay accused.17 The U.S. President also an-
nounced he would ask Congress to enact legislation explicitly
authorizing military commissions to try the individuals charged
with terrorist crimes who are detained at the U.S. Marine base in
Guantanamo Bay.1 74
There can be no doubt that prospective (international) ter-
rorism and unlawful combatancy trials will have to be in line with
171. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at Al.
172. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
173. See Bush Refuses to Abandon Tribunals, BBC, Jun. 30, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/5131812.stm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007); Bush Says He'll Work with
Congress on Tribunal Plan, CNN, Jun 29, 2006, [hereinafter Bush Work with Congress]
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/06/29/hamdan.reax/index.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2007).
174. See Bush Work with Congress, supra note 173.
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the principles set out in Hamdan. In this respect, the preceden-
tial value of the Hamdan ruling will likely reach beyond U.S. ju-
risdiction, and impact upon similar proceedings in other juris-
dictions. In light of Hamdan, such proceedings will have to meet
the following principles:
(i) Even with regard to (criminal) proceedings to try terror-
ism suspects and unlawful combatants, the judiciary in a State
retains the possibility to review the legitimacy not only of the
basis of such systems but also of the procedural rules that ap-
ply. Such judicial review can even go as far as to vitiate or
supersede potential constitutional powers of a head of State
to take particular measures with respect to combating terror-
ism. This form of review also follows from Article Six of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Article Four-
teen of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR").175
(ii) For special procedures such as military commissions to
be instituted, the criterion of military necessity must be met,
and the burden of proof lies with the government.
(iii) Procedural rules that can be certified as applicable in
such proceedings should in principle not deviate from crimi-
nal procedures prevalent in the State concerned, unless the
government shows that there is a clear need for such devia-
tion, including practical necessity therefor.
(iv) These procedural rules must at minimum meet the crite-
ria and basic principles that originate from Common Article
Three of the Geneva Conventions, further expanded by Arti-
cle Fourteen of the ICCPR.
(v) Even if the parties or one of the parties to an armed con-
flict have not ratified the Geneva Conventions, Common Arti-
cle Three is to be respected when trying individuals within or
by that State for alleged violations of the law of war.
(vi) The self-executing nature of Common Article Three is
now beyond dispute; individuals facing proceedings akin to
the Hamdan case can directly rely on its principles.
175. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Oct. 5, 1977,
999 U.N.T.S. 171. The latter also was incorporated in the Hamdan case by the District
Court of the District of Columbia judgment of November 8, 2004, by Judge James Rob-
ertson. See 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158-62 (D.D.C. 2004).
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(vii) The charges to be applied in this type of (terrorism)
proceedings ought to find support in the basic principles of
international criminal law, in particular the principles as set
forth in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, and the jurisprudence
of those tribunals.
(viii) At this point, the case law of contemporary interna-
tional criminal tribunals has a self-executing effect on domes-
tic criminal proceedings, including proceedings similar to the
Hamdan case.1 76 According to the Supreme Court, the defi-
nition of the type of offenses vindicated to prosecute viola-
tions of the law of war must at least be "plain and unambigu-
ous." 
177
It is fair to conclude that after Hamdan, trials akin to the
U.S. military commission proceedings will never be the same.
This conclusion is warranted in view of the explicit decision by
the Supreme Court on the issue of enforceability of Common
Article Three, irrespective of the status of the combatant and
nature of the conflict. The core of this historical decision is the
decision that, even assuming the charges against Hamdan are
correct, and even assuming that he is a dangerous person whose
ideas could endanger innocent civilians, the rule of law must be
maintained when trying this type of individual. The justices ex-
pressly distinguish between the authority of the government to
detain Hamdan for the "duration of active hostilities in order to
prevent such harm" on the one hand, and subjecting him to a
criminal trial on the other.178 When it comes to such a trial, "the
executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law that prevails
in this jurisdiction."'7 9 The key question becomes whether the
Bush administration is seriously complying with the principles
set forth by the Supreme Court.
VII. THE CREATION OF A NEW U.S. CODE OF MILITARY
COMMISSIONS TO PROSECUTE ENEMY COMBATANTS:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARDS
In particular, the question needs to be addressed whether
176. In Hamdan, such effect is indirectly relied upon.
177. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780 (2006).
178. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798.
179. Id.
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the New Code of Military Commissions ("CMC")ts 0 for prosecut-
ing enemy combatants launched by the Bush administration on
September 6, 2006,81 compensates for the defects revealed by
the Supreme Court in the Hamdan case. Some relevant provi-
sions of the legislation ("the Bill") are described below.
First, the CMC adapts relevant provisions of the Uniform
Code Of Military Justice ("UCMJ") to the military commission
context. The Administration purports to have carefully reviewed
the procedures of the UCMJ and to have adopted or adapted
certain UCMJ articles that would be appropriate for these mili-
tary commissions. 8 2 The Bill would provide for trial by military
commission of unlawful enemy combatants, including members
of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other international terrorists.18 3
The Bill claims to rely on existing court-martial procedures
where they make sense for terrorists, but separates the military
commission process from the court-martial process used to try
U.S. service members. The proposed procedures for military
commissions would be separate from the UCMJ provisions for
military courts-martial, with separate implementing rules.' 4 Au-
thor should re-draft section to reflect fact that bill has been
passed?
Furthermore, the CMC would track the UCMJ structure in
various respects. The Bill establishes a system of military commis-
sions, presided over by a military judge, with commission mem-
bers drawn from the armed forces, and prosecutors and defense
counsel from the Judge Advocate General Corps."8 5 The accused
may also retain civilian defense counsel if he or she so
chooses.'8 6 Trial procedures, sentencing, and intermediate ap-
pellate review generally parallel the processes currently provided
under the UCMJ.187 The bill would also provide for appellate
review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
180. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codi-
fied at 10 U.S.C. §§948a-950w).
181. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: The Administration's Legislation
to Create Military Commissions (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/ news/ releases/2006/09/ print/ 20060906-6.h tml.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 948j(b).
186. See Press Release, supra note 181.
187. See id.
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Columbia Circuit, as provided for under the Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005 ("DTA").1 88
The Bill establishes that the military judge, as in the court-
martial process, has the traditional authority of a judge to rule
on questions of law and evidence.' 89 The military judge is not a
voting member of the commission.19
The Bill increases the minimum number of commission
members from three to five and requires twelve commission
members for any case in which the death penalty is sought. 9' A
conviction would require a vote of two-thirds of the commission
members in non-death penalty cases. 19 2 As with the UCMJ, the
death penalty would require the unanimous vote of all twelve
commission members. 193
The Bill proposes a formal military appellate process that
parallels the appellate process under the UCMJ. Congress would
establish a Court of Military Commission Review within the De-
partment of Defense to hear appeals on questions of law.'94 All
convicted detainees would also be entitled to an appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, regardless of the
length of their sentence.'9 5 The Supreme Court could review
decisions of the D.C. Circuit.'9 6
Finally, the CMC provides the accused with substantial due
process rights, such as the right to a full and fair trial and the
right to cross examine witnesses against him.'97 Furthermore, it
is said that the prosecution must disclose any exculpatory evi-
dence to the defense. 98
At first sight, the CMC seems to anticipate the fundamental
criticism envisaged by the Hamdan ruling. However, when one
delves deeper into its provisions, specifically on the procedural
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) ("Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Su-
preme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions.").
189. See 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a).
190. See id. § 948j(d).
191. See id. §§ 948m, 949c, 949m.
192. See id. § 949m.
193. See id.
194. See id. § 950f.
195. See id. § 950g.
196. See id. §§ 950g, 950d.
197. See Press Release, supra note 181.
198. See 10 U.S.C. § 949j(d); see also Press Release, supra note 181.
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mechanisms applicable before the military commissions, the fol-
lowing fundamental deficiencies seen from an international law
perspective can be detected.
First, the Bill contains strict requirements limiting the intro-
duction of classified evidence outside the presence of the ac-
cused. The Bush Administration still maintains the commissions
must provide for the possibility of using classified evidence
outside the presence of t~e accused, albeit in extraordinary cir-
cumstances. The U.S. Government endorses the view that shar-
ing sensitive intelligence with captured terrorists could pose a
serious risk to national security, particularly if the terrorists
might be released before hostilities are over. According to the
CMC, where the judge finds it is warranted and fair, military
commissions can consider such evidence in extraordinary cir-
cumstances and subject to the following conditions:
- Before any classified evidence may be introduced outside
the accused's presence, the head of the executive department
that has classified the evidence must certify that sharing the
evidence would harm national security, and that the evidence
has been declassified to the maximum extent possible.199
- The military judge would be required to make specific find-
ings that excluding the accused is warranted to protect classi-
fied information, that the admission of an unclassified sum-
mary or redacted version would not be an adequate substi-
tute, that the exclusion is no broader than necessary, and that
it would not violate the accused's right to a full and fair
trial.2z°
-The accused would have to be provided with a redacted tran-
script of any portion of the proceedings from which he is ex-
cluded and an unclassified summary of any evidence intro-
duced, to the extent possible. 20 1
Second, statements allegedly obtained through use of coer-
cion are not admissible if the judge finds that the circumstances
under which they were obtained render them unreliable or lack-
ing in probative value.2 °2 Hence, this proposed provision still
leaves open the possibility that coerced testimony or statements
obtained through coercion are admissible, predicated upon a re-
199. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 949d(f)(1)-(3).
200. See id.; see also Press Release, supra note 181.
201. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 949d(f)(l)-(3).
202. See id. §§ 949r(c).
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liability test. This provision, in combination with the first ele-
ment above, renders the legitimacy of the Bill contestable.
Third, the commission proceedings must be open, except in
special circumstances where the judge makes specific findings.2 °3
Therefore, the principle of public hearings can be circum-
vented.
Finally, the Bill allegedly recognizes the accused's privilege
against self-incrimination during an actual commission proceed-
ing.2°4 However, the Administration does not accept that Mi-
randa warnings should be required before interrogating terrorist
combatants, a position that is is justified from the perspective of
the interest of collecting intelligence.20 5 Thus theoretically an
accused, under this system, could be convicted on the basis of
coerced testimony while he or she is prevented from hearing any
incriminating classified evidence. As will be seen infra, this sce-
nario under the CMC infringes principles of international law.
Moreover, with respect to the admission, in exceptional circum-
stances, of classified evidence outside the accused's presence,
The Bill goes beyond the accepted limits of international law, as
evidenced by the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECHR.")
It is possible that an analogy with the case law of the ECHR
regarding the disclosure of information in the context of terror-
ist crimes may serve to develop further guidelines with respect to
the legitimacy of the proposed CMC. 2°6 In this regard, the
ECHR has developed the following case law as to the admissibil-
ity of intelligence information as evidence for the prosecution of
alleged terrorists:
In the case of O'Hara v. United Kingdom, the ECHR held
that:
terrorist crime poses particular problems, as the police may
be called upon, in the interest of public safety, to arrest a sus-
pected terrorist on the basis of information which is reliable
but which cannot be disclosed to the suspect or produced in
203. See id. § 949d(e).
204. See id. § 948r(a).
205. See Press Release, supra note 181.
206. This sentence and the following paragraphs, through and including note 214,
are excerpted from a textbook written by the author. See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL PROCEED-
INGS 238-241 (2005).
638 FORDHAM INTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:599
court without jeopardizing the informant. However, though
Contracting States cannot be required to establish the reason-
ableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest of a suspected
terrorist by disclosing confidential sources of information, the
Court has held that the exigencies of dealing with terrorist
crime cannotjustify stretching the notion of "reasonableness"
to the point where the safeguard secured by Article 5 (1) (C) is
impaired. Even in those circumstances, the respondent Gov-
ernment have to furnish at least some facts or information
capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person was
reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged of-
fense.2
0 7
This reasoning may be applicable to the submission of intelli-
gence information into evidence before military commissions.
Second, for the ECHR, disclosure of evidence is not abso-
lute in nature; in exceptional cases disclosure of evidence may
be suppressed by the court or withheld by the prosecution when
the defense interest is outweighed by the public interest. The
ECHR put this clearly in the case of Fitt v. United Kingdom where
it said that:
the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an
absolute right. In any criminal proceedings there may be
competing interests, such as national security or the need to
protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or keep secret police
methods of investigation of crime, which must be weighed
against the rights of the accused. In some cases it may be
necessary to withhold certain evidence from the defen[s]e so
as to preserve the fundamental rights of another individual or
to safeguard an important public interest. However, only such
measures restricting the rights of the defen[c]e which are
strictly necessary are permissible under Article 6 para. 1.
207. O'Hara v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 32, 35, (2001). The applicant,
a prominent member of Sinn Fein, complained about violation of Article 5 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, and argued that in his case no reasonable suspi-
cion existed and that he had not obtained exact information regarding the origins of
the accusations. The Court emphasized that the "reasonableness" of the suspicion on
which an arrest is based forms an essential part of the safeguards against an arbitrary
arrest and detention pursuant to Article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The reasonableness of the suspicion must be based on facts and cir-
cumstances. What may be deemed as reasonable depends on the circumstances of the
case. The Court considered that when it involves terrorist crimes, not all information
may be revealed in order to protect informants or for public safety. However, even in
case terrorist crimes are suspected the safeguards of Article 5(1) (c) of the European
Convention on Human Rights apply.
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Moreover, in order to ensure that the accused receives a fair
trial, any difficulties caused to the defen[c]e by a limitation
on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the pro-
cedures followed by the judicial authorities. 20 8
This means that national security interest or the need to protect
witnesses may prevent disclosure of evidence, provided that the
defense is compensated for this handicap. Yet, it is hard to see
how this could be done in the event the evidence is decisively
dependent on this (intelligence) information.2 °9
Third, defining exactly what these "counterbalancing mea-
sures" are or could be, the ECHR opines that supervision by the
trial judge of the non-disclosed materials with a view to uphold-
ing defense rights is an essential condition. Again, in Fitt, the
ECHR holds that:
The fact that the need for disclosure was at all times under
assessment by the trial judge provided a further, important,
safeguard in that it was his duty to monitor throughout the
trial the fairness or otherwise of withholding the evidence. It
has not been suggested that the judge was not independent
and impartial within the meaning of Article 6(1). He was
fully versed in all the evidence and issues in the case and in a
position to monitor the relevance to the defence of the with-
held information both before and during the trial.21 °
Fourth, withholding of evidence by the prosecution while
circumventing the trial judge and defense-such that they are
208. Fitt v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 480, 45 (2000); see also Jasper v.
United Kingdom., 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 441, 52 (2000); Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom,
30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 1 61 (2000).
209. See infra notes 213-214 and accompanying text.
210. Fitt, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 49 (2000); see also Jasper, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 56. In
jasper the court emphasized explicitly the importance of continuous supervision by the
trial judge:
[M]oreover it can be assumed-not least because the Court of Appeal con-
firmed that the transcript of the ex parte hearing showed that he had been
'very careful to ensure and to explore whether the material was relevant, or
likely to be relevant to the defence which had been indicated to him'-that
the judge applied the principles which had recently been clarified by the
[C]ourt of Appeal, for example that in weighing the public interest in conceal-
ment against the interest of the accused in disclosure, great weight should be
attached to the interests of justice, and that the judge should continue to as-
sess the need for disclosure throughout the progress of the trial .... The
jurisprudence of the English Court of Appeal shows that the assessment which
the trial judge must make fulfils the conditions which . . . are essential for
ensuring a fair trial in instances of non-disclosure of prosecution material.
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not made aware about this non-disclosure-may lead to a dismis-
sal of the case. This can be deduced from the ECHR case of
Rowe and Davis v. United Kingdom where the court held that:
[d] uring the applicants' trial at first instance the prosecution
decided, without notifying the judge, to withhold certain rele-
vant evidence on grounds of public interest. Such a proce-
dure, whereby the prosecution itself attempts to assess the im-
portance of concealed information to the defen[s]e and
weigh this against the public interest in keeping the informa-
tion secret, cannot comply with the above mentioned require-
ments of Article 6(1).211
Notably the fact that the authorities revealed the information in
appeal did not result in a different outcome; the ECHR re-
marked in this respect that:
the Court does not consider that this procedure before the
appeal court was sufficient to remedy the unfairness caused at
the trial by the absence of any scrutiny of the withheld infor-
mation by the trial judge. Unlike the latter, who saw the wit-
nesses give their testimony and was fully versed in all the evi-
dence and issues in the case, the judges in the Court of Ap-
peal were dependent for their understanding of the possible
relevance of the undisclosed material on transcripts of the
Crown Court hearings and on the account of the issues given
to them by prosecuting counsel. In addition, the first-in-
stance judge would have been in a position to monitor the
need for disclosure throughout the trial, assessing the impor-
tance of the undisclosed evidence at a stage when new issues
were emerging, when it might have been possible through
cross-examination seriously to undermine the credibility of
key witnesses and when the defen[s]e case was still open to
take a number of different directions or emphases. In con-
trast, the Court of Appeal was obliged to carry out its ap-
praisal ex post facto and may even, to a certain extent, have
unconsciously been influenced by the jury's verdict of guilty
into underestimating the significance of the undisclosed evi-
dence. 2 1
2
The ECHR concludes that "the prosecution's failure to lay the
evidence in question before the trial judge and to permit him to
rule on the question of disclosure deprived the applicants of a
211. Rowe & Davis, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R_ at 62.
212. Id. 1 65.
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fair trial.1213
Finally, "counter balancing measures" are being positioned
by the ECHR within the endorsement of the principle of "equal-
ity of arms;" the latter principle is the decisive criterion upon
which the trial judge should assess whether non-disclosed intelli-
gence information is acceptable in court. This view is echoed by
the ECHR in Fitt:
The Court is satisfied that the defence were kept informed
and were permitted to make submissions and participate in
the above decision-making process as far as was possible with-
out revealing to them the material which the prosecution
sought to keep secret on public interest grounds.... It notes,
in particular, that the material which was not disclosed in the
present case formed no part of the prosecution case
whatever, and was never put to the jury.214
In conclusion, when reviewing the ECHR case law vis-A-vis the
admissibility of "secret" (intelligence) information into the evi-
dence in a criminal case, it is fair to say that, despite the possibili-
ties for the prosecution to do so, several fundamental procedural
and substantive safeguards are yet to be met in order to comply
with the fair trial standards. In this regard, the procedural safe-
guards set forth by the ECHR seem to be quite stringent, empha-
sizing the fair trial rights of the accused. This means that it is
highly questionable whether the proposed CMC meets these no-
tions as set forth by the ECHR. Hence, the Hamdan defense
arguments as analyzed in this article will continue to play an im-
portant role in prospective proceedings in this field.
213. Id.
214. Fitt, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 48; see also Jasper, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 55.
